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THE MINORITY UNION'S RIGHT TO STRIKE
SEYMOUR COHEN*
One of the many questions which arise in construing and
interpreting the labor policy declared by Congress in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act' and the National Labor Relations Act2
concerns the right of a minority union to strike.3 The N. L.
R. A., by incorporating the concept of majority rule, estab-
lished for the government of labor relations the democratic
principle of our political institutions. But it thereby brought
forth the problem of minorities. That particular sections of
the two acts may conflict in determining the solution to this
problem will appear.4
Labor strife by the minority is caused almost wholly by
jurisdictional5 and dual-union6 disputes over representation.
Together they apparently give rise to a relatively minor num-
* Student Research Assistant, Indiana University School of Law.
147 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-115. About one-half of the
states now have laws which similarly limit the granting of labor
injunctions by the state courts.
249 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A., §§ 151-168 (Supp. 1938). Six
states have enacted similar labor relations acts: Massachusetts
(AMASS. ANN. LAWS, Mitchie Supp. 1939, c. 150A); Minnesota
(Minn. Laws, 1939, c. 440); New York (N. Y. LABOR LAW, 1937,
§ 700); Pennsylvania (PrA STAT. ANN., Purdon 1937, tit. 43,
§ 211.1); Utah (UTAH REV. STAT., 1939, § 49); Wisconsin (wis.
STAT., 1937, § 111.00), repealed in 1939 (Laws 1939, c. 57).
3 The term "right to strike" probably should be considered to include
also the right to picket and boycott.
4 §§ 1, 7 and 13 of the Norris Act and §§ 2(9), 7, 8(1) (2) (5), 9,
10(a) (h) and 13 of the N.L.R.A. are particularly applicable.
5 "Jurisdictional dispute" refers to a dispute arising between unions
affiliated with the same national federation. Originally both the
Board and courts refused to exercise jurisdiction over these dis-
putes. California State Brewers' Institute v. International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers, 19 F.
Supp. 824 (N.D. Calif. 1937). But it has recently been declared
that the Board does have and should exercise such jurisdiction.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v. International Union
of United Brewery, etc. Workers of America, 106 F. (2d) 871
(C.C.A. 9th, 1939). Cf: Blankenship v. Rurfman, 96 F. (2d) 450
(C.C.A. 7th, 1938); United States v. Hutcheson, 32 F. Supp. 600
(E.D. Mo. 1940); and see generally, Jaffe, Inter-Union Disputes
In Search of a Forum (1940) 49 Yale L.J. 424.
6 "Dual-union dispute" refers to a dispute arising between rival unions
affiliated with different national federations.
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ber of strikes,7 but their importance is not thereby lessened.
Representation disputes will become a relatively more im-
portant cause of labor unrest, and unfair labor practices less
so, as employers come to accept the principle of collective bar-
gaining.,
The question may be specifically posited thus: May a
union representing a minority9 of the employees in an ap-
propriate unit lawfully strike (1) where no majority union
exists or is recognized by the employer, (2) where a majority
of the employees have designated their representatives for
collective bargaining and have been so recognized by the em-
ployer, (3) where proceedings for the certification of major-
ity representatives are pending before the National Labor Re-
lations Board, and (4) where majority representatives have
been certified by the Board. Two recent cases provided an
opportunity for the Supreme Court to discuss these questions,
but the Court refused to do so.
10
Minority Rights Where No Majority Exists or is Recognized
Where no organization claims to represent a majority
T The Monthly Labor Review, May, 1938-p. 1200, 1939-p. 1125, and
1940 discloses that jurisdictional and dual-union disputes account
for a small percentage of labor controversies:
Year No. Strikes No. Workers Involved Man-Hours Lost
1937 3.7% 4.5% 2.4%
1938 5.4% 5.1% 9.5%
1939 5.9% 4.2% 3.4%
See also Padway, The Norris-LaGuardia Act and the National La-
bor Relations Act (1940) 2 Nat'l L.G. Q. 227, 232.
8 "Over the course of four years the relative proportion of election and
unfair labor practice cases has reversed itself in formal Board
decisions. During the first year decisions and representation cases
were a small minority. Increasing resort to the Board to resolve
representation disputes has, when the entire four-year period is
considered, brought it about that unfair labor practice rulings
amount to about 40% of all Board decisions." N.L.R.B. Release
R-2236, Oct. 30, 1939. See also Hearings Before Committee on
Labor, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 580.
9A union, none of whose members are employees in the unit-fre-
quenty spoken of as an "outside" union- would probably have
the same rights as a minority union in the light of such cases as
Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938) and New Negro
Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938). See (1940)
15 Ind. L. J. 455.
10 Fur Workers Union, No. 21238 v. Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72,
308 U.S. 522 (1939)-a per curiam opinion affirming 105 F. (2d) 1
(1939); Retail Food Clerks & Managers Union v. Union Premier
Food Stores, Inc., 308 U.S. 526 (1940)-a per curiam opinion re-
versing 98 F. (2d) 821 (1938) because the question had become
moot (the A.F. of L. union had meanwhile been certified by the
Board and contracts between the union and employer entered into).
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of the employees in an appropriate unit, or has not been
recognized as such, unionization activities should be permitted
the widest scope. The policies of the Norris Act and the
N. L. R. A. require that "full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives" for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining be allowed the employees. Any
resulting injury to the employer would seem to be "incidental"
and "within the allowable area of economic conflict.""
Here there may be active one or more unions or em-
ployee organizations, none of which represents a majority of
the employees.32 These may be carrying on strike activities
to persuade other employees to join their organization, to
force the employer to coerce his employees to do so, or to
enforce a demand on the employer to enter into a contract
with them.3. The employer is under no duty to engage in
collective bargaining or to enter into a contract with a minor-
ity,14 but he may do so if he wishes and probably should be
encouraged to do so,15 at least in the absence of a rival minor-
ity group. 6 A minority labor organization can act as the
representative of only its members in the execution of a
bargaining contract, but the contract must accord equal treat-
ii Stillwell Theater v. Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405, 182 N.E. 63 (1932), cert.
denied 288 U.S. 606 (1933).
1 Cf. Sharp & Dohme, Inc. v. Storage Warehouse Employees Union,
24 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
3 Note that a contract with an employer is of great value to a union
in securing new members.
14Segal-Maigen Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 749 (1936); Mooresville Cotton Mills,
2 N.L.R.B. 952 (1937); Semet-Solvay Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 511 (1938).
It See, ROSENFARB, THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND HOW IT WORKS
(1940) at p. 240: "The need for collective bargaining with minor-
ities until a majority arises as a means of discouraging employers
from attempting to prevent a majority from emerging has become
imperative since the inadequacy of the board's sanctions in the case
of a failure to bargain collectively has become apparent."
The execution of a contract between the employer and one of two
rival minorities may well amount to employer discrimination even
if the contract is for its members only and non-discriminatory in
terms. Such a contract may be the deciding advantage in the
competition for membership. A very small number of employees
obtained by one union, however, should not prevent the making of a
contract with a union commanding a substantial number but not a
majority of the employees. See ROSENFARB, op. cit. supra note 15,
at 258 ff.
But if the contracting minority union is being assisted by the
employer by an unfair labor practice, the resulting contract would
constitute coercion in violation of the N.L.R.A. whether or not




ment to all employees, for Section 8 (3) of the N. L. R. A.
prohibits "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of em-
ployment or any term or condition of employment to en-
courage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
Nor may the contract contain a closed-shop provision. 17 Where
two or more minority organizations are seeking contracts,
the employer may well make separate contracts covering the
respective memberships, with a provision included in each
that it shall terminate upon the securing of a majority status
by one. From the standpoint of the employer, it would be
desirable for the contracts to require the majority status to
be shown by a certification by the N. L. R. B. and provide
that the remaining minority union will not strike while such
majority remains or during the existence of the contract
made pursuant to certification.
Clearly, in the absence of a majority, a controversy aris-
ing between the employer and the minority union or between
minority unions concerning terms of employment or rep-
resentation would be a labor dispute as so defined in both the
Norris Act and the N. L. R. A.'s The Norris Act would then
be applicable to restrict granting injunctive relief. 9
Minority Rights Where Majority Exists But is Not Certified
No Certification Proceedings Pending. No Board or
court decision has as yet affirmatively discussed the rights of
minorities under the N. L. R. A. where majority representa-
tion exists. Section 9 (a) of the N. L. R. A.20 provides that,
"Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a
unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
', A closed-shop contract is valid under N.L.R.A. § 8(3) only when
made with the majority union.
18 This must be so under the broad interpretation given to the term
"labor dispute" in Seim v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S.
468 (1937); Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938);
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552
(1938). The two statutes define the term almost identically. Com-
pare 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 113 and 152. See Pauly Jail Bldg. Co. v.
International Assn. of Bridge, etc. Workers, 29 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.
Mo. 1939) (fraudulent representations enjoined, requirements of
Norris Act having been complied with).
1 See generally, Comments (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1136, (1937) 50 Harv.
L. Rev. 1295.
2029 U.S.C.A. § 159(a).
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purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employ-
ment." This has been construed to impose a duty upon the
employer to treat exclusively with the majority representative
and the negative duty to refrain from entering into a col-
lective labor agreement with anyone else.21  This duty to
bargain collectively comes into being upon the appearance of
representatives chosen by an organized majority in an ap-
propriate unit and is in no way affected by certification. The
refusal to bargain collectively with an uncertified majority
is an unfair labor practice.22  However, the employer need
not guess at his peril as to the appropriateness of the unit nor
the validity of the majority where he is reasonably doubtful
as to either.23 But the employer may not ask the courts to
determine these questions since the Board has initial exclusive
jurisdiction in such matters.
24
The employer may find relief under the new rules of the
Board which now permit him to petition the Board for an
election and certification where two rival labor organizations
claim to represent the majority,25 or by contract. Where only
one union is claiming a majority, he may execute a temporary
agreement in which exclusive recognition is conditioned upon
a Board certification.26  Where rival unions each claim to
represent the majority, he may enter into dual contracts
with each union for its members only to become exclusive
with the one certified, with a provision, if it can be secured,
2tN.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Cf.
Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation, No. 40, 300 U.S. 515
(1937); Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548
(1930).
Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 4 N.L.R.B. 604 (1937); Griswold Mfg. Co.,
6 N.L.R.B. 298 (1938); see dictum in N.L.R.B. v. Remington Rand,
Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862, 868 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938), cert. denied 304
U.S. 576 (1938), rehearing denied, 304 U.S. 590 (1938). So also
bargaining collectively with a minority group where a majority
exists is an unfair labor practice. Zenite Metal Corp., 5 N.L.R.B.
509 (1938).
23 Cf. Huch Leather Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 394 (1939).
24 Lund v. Woodenware Workers Union, 19 F. Supp. 607 (D. Minn.
1937).
25N.L.R.B. Rules and Regulations, Art. III, §§ 1, 2 (Series 2-Effec-
tive July 14, 1939), and see post, note 45.
26 Cf. Southgate-Nelson Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. 307 (1937).
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to the effect that the losing union will not strike or picket
for a specified period of time.
2 7
Where the employer has bargained collectively with the
purported representatives of the majority, does the N. L.
R. A. protect any rights accruing to the parties under the
Act or under a contract executed pursuant thereto ?28 Do
the provisions of the N. L. R. A. and the Norris Act so con-
flict that it must be implied that the provisions of the latter
were intended to be suspended or repealed by the former in
certain situations?
It has been held that the execution of a valid bargaining
contract between the employer and the majority of his
employees gives rise to no right under the N. L. R. A. to the
protection of such contract by the federal courts and that no
proceedings between an employer and his employees under
the Act are entitled to any protection by the courts until some
affirmative action has been taken by the Board.29 Also, the
N. L. R. A. creates no federal rights, the violation of which
entitles the aggrieved party to injunctive relief in the federal
courts under the Act.30 Yet under Section 9 (a) of the N. L.
2
r See, Horton Mfg. Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 557 (1938); Kinnear Mfg. Co., 4
N.L.R.B. 773 (1938). .Cf. Comment (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 520,
528.
28 Whether a collective bargaining agreement has resulted from nego-
tiations between the employer and the purported majority union
may well make a difference. The Jones & Laughlin decision em-
phasized specifically that the N.L.R.A. does not compel any agree-
ment whatever to be consummated between employers and em-
ployees, and that it does not prevent the employer "from refusing
to make a collective contract and hiring individuals on whatever
terms" the employer "may by unilateral action determine." Where
failure to reach an agreement through collective bargaining
causes the majority to strike, there would be a labor dispute even
under the narrowest interpretation of that term. The minority
should also have the right to strike to aid the majority through
whom it is required to bargain, or to gain majority status them-
selves.
29Lund v. Woodenware Workers Union, 19 F. Supp. 607, 611 (D.
Minn. 1937). The court said, "If plaintiff's construction of the
act is to be sustained then an employer could organize a company
union and by injunction prevent a so-called employees' union from
gaining any foothold, which result would be absolutely contrary
to the intent and aims of the act in question."
30 Blankenship v. Kurfman, 96 F. (2d) 450, 454 (C.C.A. 7th, 1938)
(injunction sought by majority union to restrain the defendant
union from interfering with and intimidating its members). "It
seems clear that the only rights which are made enforceable by the
Act are those which have been determined by the National Labor
Relations Board to exist under the facts of each case, and when
these rights have been determined, the method of enforcing them
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R. A., the employer is required to bargain only with the
majority representatives, and it is an unfair labor practice
to refuse.31 It would seem then that the employer who com-
plies with the Act and bargains in good faith and executes
a contract with the majority representatives should be pro-
tected in the performance of such duty and the enjoyment of
the rights and privileges secured thereunder.
But the policy and provisions of the Norris Act deny him
the protection afforded by injunctive relief. If a labor dis-
pute exists, the procedural requirements of the Norris Act
must be complied with if the activities against which an in-
junction is asked are unlawful; an injunction cannot be se-
cured at all against certain lawful activities such as striking
and peaceful picketing.3 2 Lower federal courts have held that
no labor dispute can exist after the employer has consum-
mated a contract with the majority either because no de-
mand may lawfully be made upon the employer by any or-
ganization other than the majority33 or because no true labor
dispute between the employer and his employees can there-
after exist.34 But these decisions were made before the Su-
preme Court indicated the broad interpretation to be ac-
corded the term "labor dispute" in Lauf v. Shinner and the
New Negro Alliance case. By the weight of authority a
labor dispute does exist where the employer has entered into
a collective bargaining agreement with the majority (1)
whether or not the striking minority claims to represent a
majority,35 (2) although there is no dispute between the
employer and any of its employees as to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment and any other conditions of employ-
which is provided by the act itself must be followed." But see
Grace Co. v. Williams, 20 F. Supp, 362 (W.D. Mo. 1937), aff'd,
96 F. (2d) 478 (C.C.A. 8th, 1938).
31 See supra, note 22.
32 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 104, 107, 108.
33Donnelly Garment Co. v4 International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union, 21 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1937), Teversed on jurisdictional
grounds, 304 U.S. 243 (1938). But note the vigorous dissent of
Judge Otis at 824 ff.
34 International Union of United Brewery, etc. Workers of America
v. Calif. State Brewers' Institute, 25 F. Supp. 870 (S.D. Calif.
1938), rev'd, 106 F. (2d) 871 (C.C.A. 9th, 1939).
3, Houston & North Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. of America, 24 F. Supp. 619 (W.
D. Okla. 1938).
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ment,"8 and (3) although the dispute is really between two
unions as to which shall be the sole bargaining agency in the
outcome of which the employer is indifferent.3 7
The Norris Act then restricts injunctive relief unless the
later N. L. R. A. impliedly suspends or modifies its pro-
visions in those situations in which the employer has pro-
ceeded under the N. L. R. A. where to do otherwise would
violate its provisions. Only in Section 10 (h) of the N. L.
R. A. 38 are the limitations of the Norris Act on the power
of the circuit courts of appeal suspended. Under the doctrine
of expressio -unius the inference can be made that in all other
respects the effect of the Norris Act upon the jurisdiction
of "courts sitting in equity" is left unimpaired.3 9 Nowhere
else in the N. L. R. A. does it appear that Congress intended
to give the federal courts a broader power than that per-
mitted by the Norris Act to decree injunctive relief in labor
disputes.40 The employer probably need not allege compliance
se Grace Co. v. Williams, 20 F. Supp. 263 (W.D. Mo. 1937) (closed
shop contract), aff'd 96 F. (2d) 478 (C.C.A. 8th, 1938); Donnelly
Garment Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,
23 F. Supp. 998 (W.D. Mo. 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 99 F.
(2d) 309 (C.C.A. 8th, 1938).
2 Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union, No. 21238,
105 F. (2d) 1 (App. D.C., 1939), aff'd per curiam 308 U.S. 522
(1939). "The essential predicate of the argument (plaintiffs) is
that once a majority of the employees of a particular employer
have, without coercion on his part, made their choice of a bar-
gaining unit, any labor dispute which may be said to have been
involved theretofore has ended; therefore the restrictions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act upon the issuance of injunctions are inop-
erative. * * * But this argument rests upon the assumption that
the Federal courts have power to determine the lawful selection
of a bargaining agency by the employees. * * * We think that
the assumption that the trial court had power to make the deter-
mination in question is invalid and that the appellees' whole argu-
ment therefore falls." But cf. United Electric Coal Companies v.
Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C.C.A. 7th, 1935), cert. denied 297 U.S. 714
(1936).
88"When granting appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order,
or making and entering a decree enforcing, modifying, and en-
forcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part an
order of the Board, as provided in this section, the jurisdiction of
courts sitting in equity shall not be limited by sections 101 to 115
of this title." 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (h).
19 See Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union, 99 F. (2d) 309, 315 (C.C.A. 8th, 1938). The court also
pointed out that the only jurisdiction conferred by the N.L.R.A.
upon federal courts is conferred by §§ 160 (e), (f) upon the cir-
cuit courts of appeal with respect to enforcing, modifying, and
setting aside orders of the Board.
40 Sharp & Dohme, Inc. v. Storage Warehouse Employees Union, 24 F.
Supp. 701, 703 (E.D. Pa. 1938); Donnelly Garment Co. v. Inter-
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with Section 8 of the Norris Act 4 for a resort to all reason-
able efforts to settle the dispute would require him to bargain
or negotiate with the minority union which the N. L. R. A.
prohibits ;42 i.e., it would be unreasonable to require the em-
ployer to violate the N. L. R. A. as a prerequisite to securing
relief under the Norris Act.
48
Certification Proceedings Pending. Proceedings for in-
vestigation and certification of representatives by the N. L.
R. B. may be instituted by an employee organization,4 or by
the employer where two or more rival organizations claim
to represent the majority.4- A contract existing between the
employer and a purported majority is no bar to representa-
tion proceedings,46 regardless of the remaining duration of
the contract.4 7  Two situations may present themselves here:
(1) the Board unlimited by judicial review may dismiss the
petition for election, or (2) the union or unions involved may
national Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 21 F. Supp. 807, 828
(W.D. Mo. 1937).
4""No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any
complainant . . . who has failed to make every reasonable effort
to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of
any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary
arbitration." 29 U.S.C.A. § 108.
4229 U.S.C.A. § 159 (a); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
48 Grace Co. v. Williams, 20 F. Supp. 263 (W.D. Mo. 1937), aff'd 96 F.
(2d) 478 (C.C.A. 8th, 1938); Donnelly Garment Co. v. Interna-
tional Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 99 F. (2d) 309 (C.C.A.
8th, 1938), cert. denied 305 U.S. 662 (1939). Cf. dissent in Don-
nelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union, 21 F. Supp. 807, 830 (W.D. Mo. 1937).
429 U.S.C.A. § 159 (c) provides that "whenever a question affecting
commerce arises concerning the representation of employees, the
Board may investigate such controversy and certify to the parties,
in writing, the name or names of the representatives that have
been designated or selected."
45N.L.R.B., Rules and Regulations, Art. III 99 1, 2 (Series 2, Effec-
tive July 14, 1939). Similar provisions allowing employer peti-
tions are found in the laws of Minnesota, Minn. L.R.A. §16(b);
New York, N.Y. LABOR LAW, §705 (3), (4); Pennsylvania, Pa.
L.R.A., § 7 (c)-by employer "who has not committed an unfair
labor practice"; Wisconsin, Wis. Employment Peace Act, § 111.05
(4).
46Pacific Greyhound Lines, 22 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (1940). See generally,
Rice, The Legal Significance of Labor Contracts Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (1939) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 693, 712. Nor
is an agreement between an employer and a minority union ap-
plicable to the members only of such union a bar to certification
proceedings. Pressed Steel Car Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1938).
47Rosedale Knitting Co., 23 N.L.R.B. No. 43 (1940) (more than 1V
years of contract's 3-year term had expired).
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continue to strike while representation proceedings are pend-
ing.
The N. L. R. A. does not provide for judicial review of any
of the steps taken by the Board in a representation proceed-
ing,48 because these steps do not constitute final orders.4 9
Judicial review may be secured indirectly under Section 9 (d)
where there is a petition for enforcement or review of a
Board order restraining an unfair labor practice under Sec-
tion 10 (c) ,o since the certification proceeding becomes a part
of the record upon which the decree of the reviewing court
is to be based.01 A dismissal of its petition52 or a direction
of election which it considers to be prejudicial to its rights53
may thus cause a union to resume or continue its strike or
picketing activities.
Where the strike continues after the Board has assumed
Jurisdiction and certification proceedings are pending, can a
labor dispute over representation continue to exist and the
Norris Act apply? It has been held that, where the Board has
taken jurisdiction and is determining a representation ques-
tion, a labor dispute can not exist if the dispute concerning
representation is solely between two unions and does not in-
volve the employer, so that the Norris Act does not bar the
4N.L.R.B. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 308
U.S. 413 (1940), rev'ing 105 F. (2d) 598 (C.C.A. 6th; 1939)
(direction of election); A.F. of L. v. N.L.R.B., 308 U.S. 401 (1940),
aff'ing 103 F. (2d) 933 (App. D.C. 1939) (actual certification);
cf. Cupples Co. Manuf'rs v. N.L.R.B., 103 F. (2d) 953 (C.C.A.
8th, 1939).49 "The statute on its face thus indicates a purpose to limit the re-
view afforded by § 10 to orders of the Board prohibiting unfair
labor practices . . . . " A. F. of L. v. N.L.R.B., 308 U.S. 401, 409
(1940).
50 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (c). Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Whittier Mills Co., 111 F.
(2d) 474, 477 (C.C.A. 5th, 1940).
51 See A.F. of L. v. N.L.R.B., 308 U.S. 401, 406 (1940), affing 103 F.
(2d) 933 (App. D.C. 1939).
62 Where the Board dismisses a petition for certification because no
majority exists, seemingly the minority union or unions could le-
gally strike in an effort to secure additional members or at least
to secure a contract with the employer for their respective mem-
berships. But where the Board dismisses .a petition on the ground
that the petitioner is clearly the exclusive bargaining agency, the
situation is analogous to that in which a majority union has been
actually certified. Cf. Oakland Warehouses and Mills, N.L.R.B.
Case XX-R-152 (1937), C.C.H. Labor Law Serv. 21, 528 (not
officially reported); Stalban v. Friedman, 171 Misc. 106, 11 N.Y.S.
(2d) 343 (1939), r'ev'd 259 App. Div. 520, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 978
(1940).
5 N.L.R.B.v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 308
U.S. 413 (1940), r'ev'ing 105 F. (2d) 598 (C.C.A. 6th, 1939).
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granting of injunctive relief.54 Under the Supreme Court's
interpretation of a "labor dispute," 55 however, this situation
would be considered a labor dispute. It may be contended that
the employer has a right to non-interference while the Board
determines the agent with whom it must bargain, even though
there must be compliance with the procedural requirements
of the Norris Act.'8 Or it may be argued that an injunction
should issue to preserve the status quo pending the Board's
determination.57 Yet logically union activity should greatly
increase just prior to the actual election 58 and until that time
at least, the parties should be left to exercise their relative
economic strength.2'
Minority Rights Where a Majority is Certified
Where a union has been certified by the N. L. R. B.6 the
equities may change. One federal court 6' and several state
courts62 have granted injunctive relief against minority
"tUnion Premier Food Stores, Inc., v. Retail Food Clerks & Managers
Union, 98 F. (2d) 821 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1938); reo'd per curiam as
moot 308 U.S. 526 (1940). But see 7 I.J.A. Bulletin 25 (1938).
55 See supra, note 18.
56 Cupples Co. v. A.F. of L., 20 F. Supp. 894, 897 (E.D. Mo. 1937).
The defendant unions here attempted to withdraw their petitions
for investigation and certification.
57See Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union, No.
21238, 105 F. (2d) 1, 13 (App. D.C. 1939), aff'd per curiam 308
U.S. 522 (1939).
5sAn injunction issued during the pendency of certification proceed-
ings would in effect permit the employer to temporarily determine
the issue for a period averaging from two to six months which
is required by the Board to complete a certification proceeding.
Such a provisional determination may vitally affect the final out-
come. Comment (1939) 48 Yale L. J. 1053, 1056.
159See Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 94 F. (2d) 875, 879
(C.C.A. 2nd, 1938). Note that where unions continue to strike
despite the pendency of Board proceedings, the employer may rec-
ognize them for their members only without violating the Act
since majority representation has not been satisfactorily estab-
lished. Comment, supra note 58, at 1056.
60 Under § 9 (c) the Board can certify representatives with or without
an election. See the Board's Fourth Annual Report, Ch. VII, and
cf. (1939) 8 L..A. Bulletin 14.
Oberman & Co. v. United Garment Workers of America, 21 F. Supp.
20 (W.D. Mo. 1937) (the court held the dispute was in connection
with the procedure for collective bargaining under the N.L.R.A.
and was not a labor dispute on the ground that the Board had
settled the only possible labor dispute in the case).82 Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills v. International Woodworkers of
America, 102 P. (2d) 270 (Wash. 1940) (held no labor dispute
on the authority of the Oberman decision); Euclid Candy Co. of
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strikes under these circumstances. Other federal courts merely
recognize that such a situation may arise63 or indicate that
relief might be given. 4
Certification itself creates no rights or duties.65 It is
merely an administrative determination of fact by the Board
that the representatives certified have been lawfully chosen
by a majority of employees in an appropriate unit." The
duty of the employer to bargain with the certified represent-
atives is created by the N. L. R. A. and exists before the
certification.67 It is an unfair labor practice to refuse to
bargain collectively with the majority representatives whether
they have been certified or not." And a certification is not
reviewable by the courts until the Board petitions the circuit
court for enforcement of its order requiring the employer
to cease its unfair labor practice of refusing to bargain with
the certified representative,69 or until the employer or other
N. Y., Inc. v. Summa, 174 Misc. 19, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 382 (1940)
(certification terminated labor dispute; here however, prior to
certification it was agreed by both unions and the employer that
the losing union would not strike during the life of the closed-shop
contract to be executed by the employer and union certified).
68 Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union, No. 21238,
105 F. (2d) 1, 13 (App. D.C. 1939); Lund v. Woodenware
Workers Union, 19 F. Supp. 607, 611 (D. Minn. 1937).64 "However, if 'the relationship . . . certified by the Board, be un-
lawfully interfered with . . . it may well be that under the
principles of equity the aid of the courts may be invoked." Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. of America v. Interna-
tional Union of United Brewery, etc. Workers of America, 106 F.
(2d) 871, 876 (C.C.A. 9th, 1939); Houston & North Texas Motor
Freight Lines, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc.
of America, 24 F. Supp. 619, 640 (W.D. Okla. 1938).
65 Comment (1940) 28 Geo. L. J. 666.
66 The Board is authorized to hold elections under § 9 (c) of the
N.L.R.A. and to determine the appropriate bargaining unit under
§ 9 (b). Certification is not r'es adjudicata in a subsequent proceed-
ing for unfair labor practices. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co.,
6 N.L.R.B. 678 (1938). Section 9 (d) provides that the certifica-
tion and the record of the investigation preliminary thereto made
by the Board shall become part of the record reviewable by the
circuit courts of appeal.
67N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
68 For decisions in which there was no certification, see cases cited
supra, note 22. There was certification in N.L.R.B. v. Whittier
Mills Co., 111 F. (2d) 474 (C.C.A. 5th, 1940); Black Diamond
S. S. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 94 F. (2d) 875 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1938).
0 A. F. of L. v. N.L.R.B., 308 U.S. 401 (1940), aff'ing 103 F. (2d)
933 (App. D. C. 1939). See also, N.L.R.B. v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 34 F. Supp. 53 (D. Kans. 1940). The Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia in the Federation case held that
its decision was required by the N.L.R.A., but that the order might
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person aggrieved by the order petitions the court for review.
But certification does safeguard the employer against
having established relations upset because of inappropriate-
ness of the unit or invalidity of the method of selection70 and
removes the possibility of the courts taking upon themselves
the determination of these questions.
Although the rule of majority representation was es-
tablished by the N. L. R. A., no definition of what con-
stitutes a "majority" is to be found therein, nor has Con-
gress or the Supreme Court since defined the term. Of three
possible interpretations, the Board during the first year of
the Act adopted the most stringent, requiring that a union
must obtain a majority of the votes of all those eligible to
vote to be certified.71 The second possibility, never followed
by the Board, would require that a majority of the eligible
employees participate in the election with the union receiving
a majority of the votes cast entitled to certification. In 1936,
the Board adopted its present interpretation that a majority
of the eligible employees voting, whether or not a majority
of the employees participate in the election, is entitled to
certification.12 Those who do not participate are presumed to
be reviewable in an independent suit in equity in a district court
in light of the holdings in Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co.,
305 U.S. 177 (1938) and Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous
Coal Commission, 306 U.S. 56 (1939). Pursuant to that suggestion
suit was subsequently brought in equity in the District Court
for the District of Columbia which held that the suit could be
maintained. A. F. of L. v. Madden, 33 F. Supp. 943 (D.C. 1940).
It has been suggested that collateral review of certification
proceedings may be obtained by a union, having a contract with
the employer but losing in the certification proceedings, by suing
for specific performance of its contract. Comment (1938) 38
Col. L. Rev. 1243, 1254.
70 But see (1939) 16 N.Y.U.L. Q. Rev. 306, 309, footnote 17. "Certifi-
cation of the majority group does not always insure that such
majority is not the result of unfair labor practices since such
questions must be raised in a prior consolidated hearing, and can-
not be raised in a 9 (c) representation proceeding. Pennsylvania
Greyhounds Lines, 3 N.L.R.B. No. 622 (1937); Sandusky Metal
Prod. Corp. 6 N.L.R.B. 51 (1938); Note (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev.
1243."
Where there is an alleged improper certification acquiesced
in by the employer, the complaining labor union is without remedy,
since it cannot compel the Board to issue a complaint against the
employer. See Comment, supra note 65, at 680.
716 L.R.R. Supp. 21 (1940).
72 R.C.A. Mfg. Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 159 (1936); New York Handkerchief
Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F (2d) 144 (C.C.A. 7th, 1940).
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assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting73
However, there has been no instance as yet in which a union
was certified pursuant to a vote in which less than a majority
of those eligible participated, in which employer interference
or coercion was not found.7 4 It is true that such an inter-
pretation may lead to unfairness where a very small percent-
age of the employees participate in the election and a bare
majority of those voting choose the union thereafter certi-
fied7 5 yet a stricter interpretation might give rise to greater
inequalities .71
If the employer and majority union are entitled to pro-
tection of the relationship created through collective bargain-
ing or of a contract resulting therefrom under any circum-
stances, it most clearly would be after certification.7 There
can be no doubt or uncertainty then, so far as the employer is
78 V 'giian Ry. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 560 (1937)-
herehowever a majority of the employees participated in the elec-
tion, although the winning union received less than a majority
of the eligible votes; accord, N.L.B.R. v. Whittier Mills Co., 111
F. (2d) 474 (C.C.A. 5th, 1940).
74New York Handkerchief Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F. (2d) 144,
148 (C.C.A. 7th, 1940) (56 employees voted out of 225 eligible to
vote, with 53 voting for the union).
7 It is not likely that an abuse of the rule will occur. See New York
Handkerchief Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F. (2d) 144, 149 (C.C.A.
7th, 1940); GALENSON, RIVAL UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES
(1940) 252 ff; and see generally, Rice, The Determination of Em-
ployee Representatives (1938) 5 Law & Contemp. Prob. 188.
Experience has shown that this rule has not been a device
enabling closely-knit minorities to carry Board elections. About
90% of eligible employees usually vote in elections. The rule has
eliminated the possibility of 10% of the employees not voting,
whether because of employer coercion or indifference, preventing
the choice of representatives in closely-contested elections. ROSEN-
FARB, op. cit. supra note 15, at 234 ff.
76In R.C.A. Mfg. Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 159, 176 (1936), the opinion pointed
out that minorities, "by peacefully refraining from voting could
prevent certification of organizations which they could not defeat
in an election. Even where their strength was insufficient to
make a peaceful boycott effective, such minority organizations by
waging a campaign of terrorism and intimidation could keep
enough employees from participating to thwart certification. * * *
The 'quorum' interpretation thus introduces a qualification that
places in the hands of employers and rival labor organizations a
Weapon which may easily defeat the collective bargaining sections
of the Act."
77 See Cupples Co. v. A. F. of L., 20 F. Supp, 894, 897 (E.D. Mo. 1937);
the court said by way of dictum that the N.L.R.A. confers upon
the employer the legal right to deal exclusively with the agency
found by the Board to represent the majority after that fact has
been determined by the Board. See also Blankenship v. Kurfman,
96 F. (2d) 450, 454 (C.C.A. 7th, 1938) where Judge Treanor
suggested indirectly that there may be rights under the N.L.R.A.
enforceable in the federal courts by the majority union after ac-
tion b3r the Board.
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concerned, as to the only labor organization he must bargain
with. The certified majority union may secure a Board order
requiring the employer to bargain with it which may be
judicially enforced .7  But can protection of status and con-
tract rights against minority interference be secured here
by injunctive relief?
It is submitted that, when a minority union strikes after
a majority union has been certified as exclusive bargaining
agency of all the employees in the appropriate unit, a labor
dispute exists despite such certification and irrespective of
the validity of the objectives or legality of such a strike.
7 9
The existence of a labor dispute does not depend on where
the equities lie nor whether the party can lawfully comply
with the demands made upon it.0 Such a dispute exists where
the parties involved and the subject of dispute come within
the broad statutory definition to be found in both acts.8 ' True,
it has been held that no labor dispute can exist after certifica-
tion, but these decisions were made before the Supreme Court
demonstrated the broad scope to be given the term in its
interpretation 2 or were reached by avoiding the legal ques-
tions involved in an effort to give relief where the employer
faced intense economic hardship. 3
78 Where the employer has conspired with the minority union to defeat
the certified union's right to collective bargaining, the certified
union cannot apply directly to the courts for relief but must ap-
ply to the Board for enforcement of the certification order under
§ 10 (b)-United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of
America v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 30 F.
Supp. 927 (S.D. N.Y. 1940).
79But no "labor dispute" edsts within the terms of the N.L.R.A. in
the sense that, for a reasonable period immediately following cer-
tification, the minority union cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
Board.
80 Cf. the dissent in Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union, 21 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1937), at p.
825 ff.
Si See supra, note 18. "The (Norris) Act does not concern itself with
the background or the motives of the dispute." New Negro Al-
liance v. Santary Grocery Co. 303 U.S. 552, 561 (1938). A num-
ber of states have redefined the term "labor dispute" so as to
facilitate securing injunctive relief in certain harsh situations:
Ore. Laws 1939, c. 2; Wis. Laws 1939, c. 25; Pa, Laws 1939,
Act 163.
820berman & Co. v. United Garment Workers of America, 21 F.
Supp. 20 (W.D. Mo. 1937); accord, Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills
v. International Woodworkers of America, 102 P. (2d) 270 (Wash.
1940).
8 See, e.g., Stalban v. Friedman, 171 Misc. 106, 11 N.Y.S. (2d) 343
(1939) (no actual certification, petition dismissed on ground that
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If a labor dispute does exist, should injunctive relief be
granted nevertheless? It has been shown that Section 10 (h)
of the N. L. R. A. suspends the applicability of the Norris Act
only where the circuit courts of appeals are reviewing final
orders of the Board, and that the N.L.R.A. did not impliedly
repeal any seemingly inconsistent provisions of the Norris
Act. Further evidence that no implied repeal was intended is
to be found in Section 13 of the N. L. R. A. which provides
that "Nothing in this act shall be construed so as to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike."
Granting injunctive relief against a minority strike by hold-
ing the Norris Act inapplicable where the N. L. R. A. has
been complied with would be construing the latter act so as
to at least "interfere with" or "diminish" the circumstances
under which "the right to strike" could be exercised free
from the threat of restraint by injunction.
Here then an injunction may issue only if it be held that
the activities of the minority are unlawful because directed
toward (1) forcing the employer to breach his duty under
the N. L. R. A. and (a) bargain with the minority or (b)
conclude a closed-shop contract with the minority, or (2)
causing a breach of the contract entered into between the em-
ployer and the certified representatives of the employees. Ac-
tivities directed solely toward such objectives84 may con-
ceivably be found unlawful.85 But it may as logically be said
that the activities are directed toward doing that which
plaintiff union was clearly the majority representative), rev'd.
259 App. Div. 520, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 978 (1940) (labor dispute exists).
84Gf. Pauly Jail Bldg. Co. v. International Association of Bridge,
etc. Workers, 29 F. Supp. 15, 18 (E.D. Mo. 1939); Euclid Candy
Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Summa, 174 Misc. 19, 19 N.Y.S.(2d)382,
384 (1940) (" . . . since the picketing by the minority union is,
in effect, an attempt to force the breach of the agreement which
was entered into . . . , this court of equity should prevent the
irreparable injury which flows therefrom."). See also Eastwood
Nealley Corp. v. Internat'l. Ass'n. of Machinists, 124 N.J.Eq.274,
1 A(2d)477, 480(1938). In Magruder, A Half Century of Legal
Influence Upon the Development of Collective Bargaining (1937)
50 Harv. L.Rev. 1071, 1107, the author suggests that if a minority
union strikes despite a Board certification, such a strike might
be held illegal as a matter of common law.
85Judge Otis, dissentng in Donnelly Garment Co. v. International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 21 F. Supp. 807, 828 (W.D.
Mo. 1937), contends that the N.L.R.A. does not prohibit nego-
tiations between an employer and a national or international union
concerning the organization and ultimate representation of the
employer's employees by that union.
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is admittedly lawful-persuading other employees in the unit
to join the minority union and thus change their bargaining
representatives,86 or informing the employees and the public
as well of policies or practices of the employer with which
it is dissatisfied or which it believes should be changedA'
Probably a combination of these purposes actually lies
behind a minority strike instituted or continued after certi-
fication. To allow a court to find, according to its determina-
tion of the objectives sought, whether the minority's ac-
tivities are lawful and therefore non-enjoinable or unlawful
and therefore subject to be enjoined under the Norris Act is
to provide a standard vague and uncertain and subject to the
greatest abuse. A strike should be legislatively declared
either wholly enjoinable under these circumstances or not en-
joinable at all.
Conclusion
The hardship upon the employer 8 in the situations dis-
cussed cannot be disregarded, It is true that substantial leg-
islative aid to labor has come about but recently, but stability
in labor relations, which is the ultimate objective of such legis-
lation, is seemingly defeated where an employer continues
to be faced with labor strife although he is in good faith ful-
filling all the obligations required of him.86  Certainly dis-
90 The Board has declared the right to choose representatives "involves
the liberty to change representatives." Jefferson Electric Co.,
8 N.L.R.B. 284(1938).
87 One writer suggests that the minority's labor activities if directed
toward improving the terms of the existing collective agreement
for all are not inconsistent with the majority's bargaining pre-
rogatives. Larson, The Labor Relations Acts-Their Effect on
Industrial Warfare (1938) 36 Mlich. L. Rev. 1237, 1277. But it
would appear that, since the act makes the representatives des-
ignated by the majority the representatives of all the employees
in the unit for the purposes of collective bargaining, the minority
union would have to bargain through them. See the dictum in
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. N.L.R.B., 113 F. (2d) 85 (C.C.A.
5th, 1940). However, such a strike might be justified where the
majority representatives have failed to protect the rights of the
employees or have failed to secure the terms or conditions existent
in the industry as a whole.
8.See N.L.R.B. v. Star Publishing Co., 97 F.(2d) 465 (C.C.A. 9th,
1938), enforcing Star Publishing Co., 4 N.L.R.B, 498 (1937);
Combustion Engineering Co., Inc., 20 N.L.R.B. No. 62 (1940).
But see (1939) 8 I.J.A. Bulletin 48 to the effect that in the great
majority of cases the defeated union voluntarily acquiesces.
8 9 There is always the danger, however, that the majority union may
actually be company sponsored or dominated. The contracts
sought to be protected in Lund v. Woodenware Workers Union,
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putes over representation should cease, for a reasonable period
at least, upon the Board's certification of the representatives
with whom he must bargain collectively.
The argument most strongly emphasized against re-
straining minority strikes is that it will lead to a freezing or
self-perpetuation of the majority. 0 The force of this con-
tention is considerably lessened by present indications that
the status established by certification or other determination
of the existence of majority representatives will be considered
conclusive only for the period of about one year, after which
representation proceedings may again be instituted.91 This
is true although the bargaining contract may be for a term
longer than a year.92 But the representatives will be pre-
sumed to continue to represent the majority until it is af-
firmatively established otherwise.9
It has also been said"4 that majority rule is essentially
not prejudicial to minority rights because collective bargain-
ing agreements cannot discriminate against minority groups
and the majority must be organized to practice genuine col-
lective bargaining. Policies, laws, and regulations must nec-
essarily express the will of the greatest number, for collective
19 F. Supp. 607 (D. Minn. 1937) and Grace Co. v. Williams, 20
F. Supp. 263 (W.D. Mo. 1937), aff'd. 96 F. (2d) 478 (C.C.A.
8th, 1938) were subsequently held void by the Board as having
been made with a company union. Lund Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 423
(1938); The Grace Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 766 (1938).
90 Cf. Comment, supra note 58; Larson, loc. cit. supra note 87, at 1276;
(1939) 6 U. Of Chi. L. Rev. 317.
91 See GALENsoN, op. cit. sp'ra note 75, at 256. The Board has held
that a new certification is not barred by a certification made 14
months before. New York & Cuba Mail Steamship Co., 9 N.L.R.B.
51 (1938); cf. Showers Bros. Furniture Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 585 (1937);
Todd-Johnson Dry Docks Inc., 10 N.L.R.B. 629 (1938); Whittier
Mills Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 457 (1939). In New York certification is
generally conclusive for one year.-N.Y.L.R.B., Preliminary Rules
and Regulations, Art. III § 11.
92 The Board has indicated it will not grant a petition for election and
certification where the contract has less than a year to run. Su-
perior Electrical Products Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 19 (1938); National.
Sugar Refining Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1939). Contracts for a
term longer than a year existed in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
7 N.L.R.B. 662 (1938); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 8
N.L.R.B. 508 (1938).
98N.L.R.B. v. Whittier Mills Co., 111 F. (2d) 474 (C.C.A. 5th, 1940).
9 4 ROSENFARB, op cit. stpra note 15, at 226; LEISERSON, RIGHT AND
WR NG IN LABOR RELATIONS (1938) 46-49. The proviso in § 9 (a)
of the N.L.R.A. preserves the right of minorities to present griev-
ances to the employer.
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bargaining concerns matters in which all of the employees
have a common interest.
Nevertheless, the minority's right to strike exists (1)
whether or not there is a majority union, (2) where certifica-
tion proceedings are pending, and (3) even where majority
representatives have been certified by the N. L. R. B.95 Al-
though this right to strike is protected by existing law, it is
apparent, today, that excessive exercise of the right will bring
general public disapproval. National union administration
must settle its own minority disputes-failing in this, it can
expect hostile courts and legislatures to curtail seriously exist-
ing rights.
95 The point suggested in Houston, etc. Freight Lines, Inc. v. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. of America, 24 F. Supp.
619, 640 (W.D. Okla. 1938), that the Board may be able to secure
an injunction against the minority union in order to make ef-
fective its certification order, is of doubtful validity since the
Board is only empowered to proceed against unfair, labor prac-
tices of employers. See also Comment, supra note 69, at 1266 as
to the possible use of the "Reconstruction conspiracy, statute"--
REV. STAT. § 5508 (1878), 18 U.S.C.A. § 51 (1934).
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